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VOTING TRUSTS AND HOLDING COMPANIES.
The purpose of the following article is to discuss the funda-
mental principles involved in the creation of trusts and contracts
with reference to the voting power of stock in corporations, and
also the right of corporations to vote upon the stock of other
corporations held by them. The subject is one involving much
confusion in the decisions, but has become of great practical im-
portance on -account of recent events in the financial world. The
writer's fundamental premise is the generally accepted rule that
the majority of the stock of the corporation has the right to control
its management absolutely, whether that majority of stock be owned
by an individual, or by a combination of individuals, incorporated
or unincorporated; such right of control being subject only to
the limitation that it must not be used for purposes of fraud. This
doctrine has been so often affirmed by the courts that it may be
regarded as a fundamental principle of corporation law. It is
true that traces of a different doctrine are to be found, to wit, the
doctrine that the majority stockholder is a trustee and that his
dealings with the corporation are to be treated as fiduciary trans-
actions; but this doctrine, however unimpeachable from an ethical
standpoint, seems to have been able to triumph finally only in
Colorado.
THE NATURE OF VOTING TRUSTS, POOLS, ETC.
There are three elements in the right of property: the legal
title, the beneficial interest and the right of control or manage-
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ment. In complete ownership all these are united in one person;
but they may be, and often are, divided among different persons.
In the case of a trust, the title is in the trustee; the beneficial interest
is in the cestui que trust; while the right of control is in the former
or in the latter as the trust is active or passive. Stock is property;
and the elements of that property may be separated and divided
among different persons. The title may be vested in A,
the right to dividends in B, the right to vote in C.
This elementary principle of law, however, has not met
with universal acceptance by the courts. It has sometimes
been said that the right to vote cannot be separated from the owner-
ship of stock ;" and sometimes even that the right to vote cannot be
separated from the beneficial ownership of that stock.2  In order
to appreciate the force of these views it becomes necessary to
analyze the different situations which may be created with regard
to the voting power of stock.
First, A gives B a proxy to vote upon A's shares. B is a
mere agent, and the proxy is revocable at any time.3
Second, A puts his shares in B's name in trust for himself. B,
as the holder of the legal title, has the voting power; but as the
trust is a naked or dry trust, B is bound to vote in accordance
with A's wishes, or to give A a proxy. The trust itself, moreover,
may be terminated at any time.4
Third, A puts his shares in B's name, but creates an active
trust, giving B the power to manage and dispose of the shares for
A's benefit at his discretion. Here B is invested not merely with
the legal title but also with the power of control. A, having re-
tained only the beneficial interest, has no right to vote or to control
B's vote.5
Fourth, A gives B a proxy which is called irrevocable. If
there is no consideration for the transaction, the proxy is revocable
as in the first case. Suppose, however, that B gives a consideration
for the proxy. The power of voting is then coupled with an in-
terest, and like all powers coupled with an interest, becomes irre-
vocable for the time specified, which may be in perpetuity.8 The
two objections made to this rule are first, that the power is not
coupled with an interest ; and second, that the contract is illegal
and against public policy. The question of legality will be dis-
cussed hereafter. As to the first objection, it involves a fallacy.
Because the holder of the proxy has no interest in the diddends,
it is said that he has no interest in the shares. As a matter of fact,
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however, known to every one in the business world, the right of
voting is a valuable right, as well as the right to receive dividends.
One who has bought that right and paid for it has acquired an
interest in the res upon which the power is to be exercised, and
the power is therefore irrevotable.8
Fifth, A and B agree that their stock shall be voted in accordance
with the will of C. This agreement, if legal, gives to A and to B
respectively the right to insist that the other shall allow C to vote
upon his shares. The situation is substantially the same if A, B,
and C agree that all their votes shall be cast in accordance with
the wishes of the majority, or of one of them."
Sixth, A, B, and C transfer their shares to D in trust for the
purpose of voting upon them. If there is nothing more, there is
a mere naked trust, as in the second case.'" If, however, there is
an agreement between A, B, and C, that the trust shall continue
for a certain period, the situation is like that in the fifth case. The
trust becomes an active one; and the duty of the trustee is to
exercise his discretion in voting the stock, A, B, and C having
bound themselves to abide by his discretion. The situation is
substantially the same if the trustee is bound to vote in accordance
with the wishes of a majority of the beneficial owners, or of a
particular owner.11
THE LEGALITY OF CONTRACTS AND TRUSTS AFFECTING THE VOTING
POWER OF STOCK.
If stock is to be treated as other property, what element of
illegality can be found in any of the situations presented in the
preceding analysis? In the absence of statute, "we can perceive no
reason offensive to public policy, preventing a stockholder from
giving another power over, or rights in, his shares in a corporation
to the same extent that he might give in any property."'12 "Com-
bination of common interests is necessary, and constantly is taking
place. It is as legitimate for a majority of stockholders to combine
as for other people."' 13 "What are known as pooling agreements
are not necessarily illegal, but each case will depend upon the
objects to be attainned."' 4 An agreement by shareholders for a
valuable consideration that they will vote their shares so long as
they hold them in a particular way is valid.' 5  "An agreement which
seeks to control the stock of a corporation for purposes of manage-
ment, lawful in itself, is not subject to any infirmity, but is the
exercise of a legal right."sa And yet, in spite of all this, there is
fX
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undoubtedly a strong prejudice in the minds of many against the
validity of voting contracts and agreements. What are the objec-
tions raised?
The first objection is that a stockholder owes to other stock-
holders the duty of exercising and expressing his judgment in
respect to the control and management of the affairs of the cor-
poration.16 The fallacy here is in the use of the word "stockholder"
to denote the beneficial owner of the stock. It is true that there
are statutes in some jurisdictions which may be construed as im-
posing such a duty on the beneficial owner of stock. In the absence
of statute, however, suppose that A and B form a partnership,
each furnishing part of the capital to purchase certain stock. It
is agreed that A shall have the dividends and B the right to vote.
What injury this agreement inflicts on their fellow stockholders is
not apparent.'7 Has C the right to insist that A shall vote upon
the stock bought with the firm's capital? or if A will not vote, that
B shall be allowed to share in A's dividends? Sometimes it is even
said that A owes a duty to the public to vote in order to prevent
the corporation from violating the law !18
The second objection to voting trusts is that the stockholders
excluded from the trust are deprived of the right to combine with
other stockholders to elect a majority of the directors; in other
words, that the minority stockholders are permanently excluded
from a voice in the management. 19 It is conceded that the majority
stockholders have the right to manage the corporate affairs; but
it is denied that the majority have the right to insure the permanent
control of the corporation by a majority of that majority through
the formation of a voting trust. The fact that permanence of
control is one of the most important factors in corporate finance
makes little impression on those who forget Lord Bowen's maxim,
"Law should follow business. '20 A slight familiarity with the
circumstances of recent "raids" on corporations is sufficient to show
the unsoundness of the foregoing objections from a business stand-
point; while the technical reason for upholding the control of a
majority of the stock by a corporation, and refusing to allow that
control by a voting trust, is not apparent. It has been said that
each stockholder has a right "to the benefit of the fundamental and
statutory rule that the best interests of the minority are found in
a rule by the majority." 2" It would seem to follow that the best
interests of the majority stockholders as a whole may be intrusted
to a majority of that majority. The minority stockholders are
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equally deprived of an opportunity to combine with other stock-
holders when a corporation owns the majority of the stock; and to
some extent, when any of the stock is owned by a corporation,
since the control of that stock is in the hands of the majority of
that corporation. It is submitted that the only right which any
stockholder has against other stockholders is to insist that the control
of the corporation by one or more of them shall not be used for
purposes of fraud and oppression; and that the minority stock-
holder has no concern with the ownership of the majority stock,
or with the division of that ownership between different parties,
unless some fraud is practiced or intended against him personally.
If, however, there is any illegal object in the voting combination,
it should of course be set aside. It is illegal for the majority to
use their power of control for the purpose of securing to them-
selves special advantages at the expense of the minority.
22 It
may perhaps be illegal for the holders of a majority of stock in
two competing railroad companies to create a voting trust of their
holdings, though the determination of this question awaits the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Northern
Securities case.
23
In some cases a distinction is drawn between combinations
to control the voting power permanently, and contracts to control
that power for a "fixed, definite, and reasonable" period.24 The
reason for this distinction is not apparent. If the combination in
question interferes with the rights of other stockholders, or of the
public, for any period, however short, it is illegal.25 If it does
not so interfere in its inception, there can be no particular time at
which the combination, previously lawful, immediately becomes
unlawful. Neither the rule against perpetuities, nor the rule against
restraints on alienation has any application to the case. There is
no contingent future interest, violating the former rule; nor any
restraint upon the alienation of the entire property in the stock
with the consent of all the persons interested. It is true that the
voting power of A's stock cannot be alienated without B's consent;
but this is no more a restraint on alienation than B's easement in
A's land is a restraint on the alienation of the land.
2G
Another distinction as to the validity of voting combinations
has been drawn with reference to the consideration for the agree-
ment between the stockholders. It has been said that if the only
consideration for the creation of a voting trust is the mutual
promises of the stockholders that the stock shall be voted by the
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trustee, the trust is revocable ;27 while if there is some other con-
sideration, it may 'be irrevocable. To make the validity of an
agreement depend upon the question whether the consideration is
executed or executory, is to introduce a distinction unknown to
the law of contracts. Mutual promises are just as valid a con-
sideration for each other in other contracts as the payment of money;
why not in voting contracts?
Another difficulty with voting combinations has been caused
by a misapprehension of the distinction between dry and active
trusts. It has been said that the fact that the trustee has no
beneficial interest in the shares, and no function to perform except
that of voting, makes the trust a dry trust.28  It is clear, however,
that if the trust is created for the purpose of carrying out a certain
policy, the trustee has an active duty to carry out that policy,
and the trust is an active one. 29 And it seems equally clear that
the mere agreement of the stockholders that the trustee shall
exercise the voting power shows that they regard the exercise of
the discretion of the trustee as important for their own interests,
and makes the trust an active one.30
A distinction has been drawn between a voting trust formed
for the purpose of carrying out a certain policy in the management
of the corporation, and a trust where the formulation and execution
of a plan for the management are left to the trustee;31 but the
reason for this distinction is not apparent. If A is a literary man,
and B a banker, may not A transfer his shares to B, in trust to
manage them like any other property as an active trustee? Does
the fact that B's judgment, and not A's, is to govern, affect the
validity of the trust? And if A, owning a majority of the stock,
may create an active trust for his own benefit, why may not A,
C, and D create a similar active trust for their joint benefit? The
only answer is that the other stockholders are entitled to the benefit
of the judgment of A, C, and D, regardless of the fact that B's
judgment may be far more valuable, not merely to the majority
stockholders, but to the corporation itself, and that A, C, and D
all recognize that fact; which is not convincing. 2
Another distinction has been drawn between an agreement
between A and B that B's stock shall be voted as A may direct,
and an agreement that B's stock shall be voted as C may direct,
C being a person neither interested in the stock nor a representative
of persons interested.33  This distinction is based on no satisfactory
reason. If A, owning i,ooo shares, may agree that his stock shall
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be voted as B, owning one share, may direct, why may he not
agree that C shall vote on the stock, although C does not own
a single share? C is not interested in A's stock, it is true; but
neither is B; for B's holding of a single share gives him no interest
whatever in A's i,ooo shares.
Still another source of confusion has been the failure to dis-
tinguish between trusts and proxies. A proxy is a mere .agent;
and agency is always revocable unless the power is coupled with
an interest. A trustee is not an agent. He has the title to the
property, and the power of management, unless the trust is a dry
trust, when the right of control is in the cestui que trust. Because
a proxy is revocable, it has been assumed that a voting trust is
revocable ;34 and statutes limiting the creation of proxies have been
construed as applying to the creation of trusts. 35 It is witfin the
power of the legislature to regulate the right of voting, and to
limit that right to persons having the beneficial interest in the
stock; but a limitation on the creation of proxies should not be
held to apply to the creation of trusts, unless it is clear that the
legislature meant what it did not say; and it is reasonable to suppose
as matter of law, if not as matter of fact, that statutes are drawn
deliberately and with ordinary knowledge of the meaning of legal
terms.
It may be said that almost the entire difficulty with reference
to voting combinations springs from a single fact-the refusal to
recognize that the voting power of stock is a valuable property
right3" as well as the right to receive dividends. Every business
man knows that the right of control has a money value distinct from
the right to receive dividends; and recognizing that fact, contracts
are daily made with reference to the right of control. To say
that that is not to be treated as property, valuable and transferable
property, which is so clearly recognized by all financiers as such,
is to involve the law in constant confusion, and to impede the
legitimate pursuit of happiness by the. holders of corporate stock.
The courts have apparently been misled to some extent by a
supposed analogy between the duty of a citizen to the State in
voting, and the duty of a stockholder to a corporation. There
is no satisfactory middle ground between the doctrine that each
stockholder is a trustee for the corporation," and the doctrine
that the duty of the stockholder is simply a duty not to defraud
the corporation by using his power of control to its injury.38 The
former doctrine is generally repudiated on the score of convenience;
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but the alternative is not always so clearly recognized; and the
result is confusion.
The real nature of a share of stock is this: It is a right to
share in the profits of the corporation as those profits are made
and distributed in the form of dividends under the control of the
majority stockholders, plus a right to insist that the majority
stockholders shall not commit fraud, plus a chance that the share-
holder may, by acquiring the ownership or control of the majority
of the stock, control the corporation entirely at his own discretion,
so long as he does not commit fraud on the other shareholders. Of
his rights the shareholder cannot be deprived; but his power of
control is not an absolute right; it is merely a contingent right,
the contingency having no relation to the ownership or control of
an individual share, but being dependent solely upon the ownership
or control of a majority of the shares. If the majority shareholder
is an individual, the minority stockholder has no right against
him except to insist that he shall not defraud the corporation.
The minority stockholder's rights are not increased by the fact
that the majority of the stock is held by a combination of individuals,
whether in the form of a trust, a pool or a corporation. The only
logical ground upon which any arrangement between the majority
stockholders can be attacked is that the object and effect of that
arrangement is to deprive the minority of their substantial rights.
To say that a voting trust causes a direct injury to the minority
stockholders "by stripping from their stock an element of pecuniary
value to which they are entitled"2 9 involves what is known in logic
as a fallacy of division. The thing of value is the power of
controlling the corporation, not the mere right to vote. In a
corporation with Ioo shares, of which 51 are controlled by a
single shareholder, the right of the holder of the other 49 shares
to vote is of no practical value whatever, so far as the ordinary
management of the corporation is concerned. The thing which
really is of value, the power of control, attaches only to the owner-
ship of the majority of the stock as an entity, and the fallacy of
division occurs in attributing to each share which goes to make up
that majority, an element of value which belongs only to all the
shares composing that majority taken together.
THE RIGHT OF ONE CORPORATION TO VOTE UPON THE STOCK OF
ANOTHER HELD BY IT.
The right of one corporation to buy stock in another is not for
discussion here. The buying corporation may or may not have
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that right. If it has that right, it becomes the owner of the stock,
and possesses all the rights of ownership. If it has not that right,
the general rule governing ultra vires transactions governs; the
contract for the purchase is void, but the title to the stock passes
upon the completion of the sale.40 The title having vested in the
purchasing corporation, the purchaser has all the rights of owner-
ship, regardless of the fact that the transaction was illegal in its
inception.4 '
The first objection raised to these elementary principles is that
if the holding corporation were to vote upon the stock it would be
engaging in a business not authorized by its charter.42 The answer
to this objection is that the State alone is concerned with the
question. The title to the stock having vested in the purchasing
corporation, the right to vote is merely one of the necessary incidents
of ownership. The exercise of the rights of an owner by a cor-
poration can never be questioned on the ground that the acquisition
of the property is ultra vires.43 Moreover, it is unsound to speak
of a stockholder as engaging in the business carried on by the
corporation. 44
Another objection to the voting of stock in one corporation by
another is that where the voting corporation is a competitor of
the other, it is interested in sacrificing its rival.4  That the
holding corporation should be restrained from injuring its rival
is clear ;46 but the fact that an individual stockholder is a competitor
of his corporation does not restrict his right to vote; why then
should the fact that the corporation and the corporate stockholder
are rivals affect the rights of the latter ?47
Another objection to such voting is that the directors elected
by the holding corporation would be subject to a conflict of duties.4 8
There is no more reason, however, why the directors of a corporation
should violate their duties in the interest of a corporate stockholder
than in the interest of an individual stockholder controlling the
same amount of stock.
Another objection to such voting is that it may operate in
restraint of trade.4 9  It is obvious that if one corporation holds
the najority of stock in one or more other corporations, there will
be no real competition between them. There is no common law
rule, however, requiring corporations to compete with each other
whether they wish to do so or not. Statutes may affect the case
in various ways. The legislature may absolutely prohibit cor-
poration A from acquiring stock in corporation B, so as to prevent
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A from acquiring any title to the stock.5" This situation is un-
usual. Or the legislature may provide that no corporation shall
hold stock in a competing corporation, or in two corporations
which are themselves competitors. This, in effect, is the con-
struction placed upon the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, so far as
interstate commerce is concerned, by the Federal court in the
Northern Securities Case.51 The question of the construction of
that act, or of its constitutionality, if the construction placed upon
it by the court is correct, need not be here discussed. It may be
suggested, however, that the court does not pay sufficient attention
to the distinction between the legality of the motive governing
the Securities Company in its purchase of the stock of the competing
roads, and the motive of the stockholders of that company in
forming it, on the one hand, and the legality of the purchase itself
on the other. If any existing corporation had the right to purchase
the stock of the competing roads, there could be no illegality in
the formation of a new corporation for that purpose. Conversely,
if it was illegal for the Securities Company to make.the purchase
in question, because it was formed for the object of making that
purchase, it could only be because the purchase of a controlling
interest in the stock of two competing roads by any corporation is.
illegal under the Sherman Act.
Even if the purchase of stock by a holding company in com-
peting corlorations is illegal, the title to the stock passes; and with
it the right to vote. Under the Sherman Act, the purchasifig
corporation, it has been held, may be restrained from voting upon
the stock at the instance of the United States,52 but not at the
instance of a State in which the competing corporations operate,
even though the holding company has violated the criminal law of
that State ip making the purchase.5 3 It seems clear that nb
minority stockholder should have the right to enjoin the holding
company ,from voting without showing some threatened injury to
himself.
It has been said that a corporation holding the majority of
stock in another corporation and assuming the control of its affairs
through its control of its officers and directors,, becomes for all
practical purposes "the corporation of which it holds a majority
of stock, and assumes the same trust relation towards the minority
stockholders that a. corporation -itself usually bears to its stock-
holders."' ' Legally, -however,, there is no difference between the
duty of an individual majority stockholder and that of a corporate.
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majority stockholder. Whatever duties the majority owe to the
minority ought to be the same in all cases, and not restricted to
the case where the majority stockholder is "a corporation or a
combination of individuals." Unfortunately, the rights of minority
stockholders are by nor means clear. The courts are hesitating
to-day between applying the strict rule applicable to directors, and
treating the majority stockholders as fiduciaries, and applying the
rule of convenience, that the acts of the majority can only be
attacked by proof of actual fraud. It is perhaps, natural, there-
fore, that the stricter rule should be the more readily invoked
where the majority stockholder is a corporation than in other cases.
The effect of the organization of a series of corporations, each
controlling a bare majority of the stock in the one preceding, and
thereby giving to the holder of a majority of the stock of the
last corporation, having but a few thousand dollars capital, the
control of the first of the series with a capital of many millions, is
questioned in Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. 5  The court in-
timates that the minority holders of the largest corporation might
"disfranchise the few irresponsible adventurers who assumed to
wield the voting power of the majority of the stock-disfranchise
this stock until the beneficial owners of it should take control of
their own property and use its voting power." The answer to
this is that the beneficial owners of the largest corporation A, are
first, the minority stockholders and, second, corporation B; while
the beneficial owners of corporation B are" first, the minority stock-
holders of that corporation and second, corporation C. Now if
the minority stockholders of corporation A undertake to disfran-
chise the stock held by corporation B in corporation A, they are
disfranchising the minority stockholders of corporation B, who
have an interest in corporation A; while if the minority stockholders
in B are allowed to vote at stockholders' meetings of A, then the
minority stockholders of C, D, E, etc., should also be allowed to
vote at such meetings. This would require, first, the ignoring of
all the corporate entities; second, the determinatioft of how many
votes should be cast by the minority stockholders of the respective
corporations at the meetings of each corporation-a practical im-
possibility; and third, the control of each corporation by a minority
of its legal stockholders, in violation of well settled general principles
of law. The court in the second place intimates, "that the actual,
beneficial owners of the majority of stock in corporation A might
break through the chain of corporate fictions which separated them
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from their property, and dictate how its voting power should be
exercised." The answer to this is that the "actual, beneficial
owners" of corporate property are the stockholders; that when
corporation B owns stock in corporation A, the actual, beneficial
owners of that stock are the members of corporation B; and if
corporation Z owns stock in corporation Y, the actual, beneficial
owners of that stock are the members of corporation Z. To deny
to the majority of the stockholders of corporation Z their right
to control the vote upon the stock held by Z in Y, is to deny to
them that power of control of the corporate property by the majority
which is a fundamental principle of corporation law. And if the
power of one corporation to own and vote upon stock in another
corporation is conceded by the law, that right cannot logically be
granted to corporation Z, whose members are individuals, and
denied to corporation B, the majority of whose stock is held by
corporation C, merely on the ground that the ultimate control of
A is thereby vested in the majority' stockholders of Z. The third
suggestion of the court is that the holding companies might be
dissolved at the suit of the State as formed for an unlawful purpose.
The nature of the supposed illegality, however, is not apparent,
except upon the theory that one corporation has no right to acquire
a controlling interest in another,--a theory which is expressly
repudiated by the court.
The effect of the transaction in the case of the Prudential
Insurance Company would have been to enable the directors of
the insurance company by using the funds of the insurance com-
pany to purchase a controlling interest in the stock of a trust
company, which would in turn purchase from those directors the
controlling interest in the insurance company. The result would
have been to place the existing board of directors in permanent
control of both companies. This was treated by the court as
ultra vires on the part of the directors; but as the directors con-
trolled the majority of the stock, they would have the right as
stockholders to ratify their own acts as directors unless such acts
were fraudulent or prohibited by the charter of the corporation.
Edward Avery Harriman.
Derby, Conn., December, 19o3.
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